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Ethnic Interest Groups in 
American Foreign Policy* 
James M. McCormick 
In March 2010, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs narrowly passed 
H. Res. 252 by a vote of 23-22 and sent the resolution to the full House 
for its consideration. The non-binding resolution called upon the presi-
dent to acknowledge the Armenian genocide of 1915 by_ Turkey. Three 
years earlier, the same resolution passed the committee by a larger margin 
(27-21), but failed to reach a vote on the House floor. The Armenian As-
sembly and the Armenian National Committee of America, the key interest 
groups of the Armenian community in the United States, supported and 
lobbied for the 2007 and 2010 resolutions. Both resolutions elicited a large 
number of cosponsors from members of the House of Representatives, 143 
for the 2010 resolution and 212 for the 2007 one. These two resolutions 
also sparked intense lobbying by Turkish interests, both within the United 
States and from abroad. The 2007 resolution Hpitted Turkey's money and 
high-placed connections against a persistent and emotional campaign by 
Armenian-American citizens' groups, w and the 2010 resolution stimulated 
Ha full-page ad in the Washington Post" by Turkish groups and a visit of eight 
Turkish parliamentarians to Capitol Hill over the impending committee 
vote. Yet these resolutions caused more than just a dash between domestic 
interest groups and foreign lobbies on both sides of the issue; they also 
caused foreign policy difficulties between United States and Thrkey. Just 
prior to the 2010 committee vote, for instance, Turkish President Abdullah 
Gul called President Obama apparently to seek his help in stopping this 
resolution, and Turkey subsequently recalled its ambassador to the United 
States in protest when the resolution passed in the Foreign Affairs Com-
'All endnotes have been deleted. 
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mittee. Turkish interests also made veiled threats about further disruption 
in U.S.-Turkish relations as a result of the passage of this resolution. In all, 
these nonbinding resolutions, advocated and opposed by competing ethnic 
interest groups, had the potential of disrupting foreign relations between 
the United States and Turkey. 
To be sure, the Armenian and Turkish lobbies are relatively small in 
comparison to the size of other ethnic lobbies, and the nonbinding reso-
lution may have more symbolic than substantive effect on foreign policy. 
Yet this episode exemplifies how organized and mobilized ethnic interest 
groups can affect foreign policy debate at home and may disrupt relations 
abroad. Is this the case for other ethnic groups as well, or is this an isolated 
instance of ethnic and foreign lobbies involved in U.S. foreign policymak-
ing? Indeed, are other ethnic and foreign lobbies more consequential for 
the foreign policy process? 
In this chapter, we address these and related questions . . . . !O]ur point 
of departure is to identify the number and type of foreign policy interest 
groups at the present time. Next, we evaluate several ethnic interest groups 
that have operated for some time and have had an impact on American for-
eign policy over the years. Then we turn to identify and assess the potential 
role of several new and emerging ethnic groups that have become active 
more recently. With all of these groups, we utilize several criteria for evalu-
ating their effectiveness and judging their relative impact on U.S. foreign 
policy. We conclude by considering the overall influence of these kinds of 
interest groups on the conduct of American foreign policy. 
NUMBER AND 1YPES OF 
FOREIGN POLICY INTEREST GROUPS 
The number and types of interest groups active on foreign policy today 
are indeed numerous, but identifying the precise number is difficult to do 
for several interrelated reasons. As the foreign policy agenda of the United 
States has expanded from its traditional emphasis on security concerns to 
one that now encompasses economic, environmental, and social issues, 
foreign policy interest groups have grown exponentially. As this agenda has 
expanded, the decision-making arena on foreign policy has as well. Now 
more policymaking involves Congress and the executive branch-and more 
foreign policy interest group involvement as well. Because such groups of-
ten form, lobby, and then disband, it is difficult to track their exact number 
at any particular time. Finally, and importantly, we have no single account-
ing mech~nism o.r re~orting requirement to identify the number or types of 
th~se foretgn pohcy ~nterest groups; instead, we necessarily must rely upon 
esumates from a vanety of sources. 
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Yet the estimates of interest groups vary widely. One estimate judged 
that there were about 11,000 firms or groups lobbying in Washington, 
DC, and these firms employed about seventeen thousand individuals to 
seek to influence the policy process. Another estimate, based upon the 
growth of nongovernmental organizations, or NGOs, worldwide, placed 
the number anywhere from 5,600 to 25,000 and even to 100,000 such 
groups. These interest groups or NGOs are surely not all concerned with 
foreign policy (although the line is blurring between domestic and for-
eign policy concerns for many lobbying groups). In all, whatever the exact 
number, these estimates do illustrate how numerous and pervasive such 
groups have become today and thus have the potential to affect foreign 
policy. 
As the number of foreign policy interest groups has increased in recent 
decades, the types of such groups have as well. Foreign policy interest 
groups include some traditional lobbying groups, such as business groups, 
labor unions and agricultural interests, with their principal focus on inter-
national trade issues (although increasingly these groups take stances on 
a broad array of other foreign policy concerns as well), and they now also 
include several newer groups that are active on foreign policy. These groups 
include religious communities, veteran organizations, academic think-
tanks, ideological organizations (such as the Americans for Democratic 
Action (ADA), and single-issue interest groups (e.g., United Nations Asso-
ciation of the United States, Union of Concerned Scientists, and Americans 
against Escalation in Iraq). 
Yet this listing does not include arguably the oldest foreign policy 
lobby, ethnic interest groups. Ethnic groups, or those groups of Ameri-
cans who hold a particular concern for U.S. policy toward the particular 
country or region of their own or their ancestors' origin, are not only the 
oldest foreign policy lobby, but, in many ways, they also frequently tum 
out to be the most influential. In important ways, too, these ethnic groups 
are often tied to foreign country lobbies, or those groups that directly 
lobby the American government on behalf of another nation. (As a result 
of these international linkages, American ethnic groups may sometimes 
get extra scrutiny by the U.S. government to make certain that they are 
in compliance with the strictures in the Foreign Agents Registration Act 
and are not acting as foreign agents of another government.) These for-
eign lobbies, moreover, are increasingly numerous and consequential, 
and they often complement the work of ethnic groups. Foreign country 
lobbies can appeal to American ethnic groups that share their views on a 
particular issue to broaden their level of support, and ethnic groups can 
gain support from foreign lobbies (and particularly their domestic repre-
sentatives) to aid in making their case to Congress or the executive branch 
on a particular issue. 
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PRINCIPAL ETHNIC LOBBIES 
Although ethnic lobbies are increasingly numerous today, the level of ~ctiv­
ism and effectiveness of individual lobbies varies. Traditionally, Amencans 
of Jewish, Irish , and Eastern European heritage have been the most active 
ethnic lobbies on foreign policy. Over the past several decades, however, 
Americans of African, Arab, Armenian, Cuban, Greek, Hispanic, Mexjcan, 
and Turkish descent have been increasingly active on foreign policy issues 
as well. Recently, yet another group, Indian Americans, has become increa~­
ingly involved in the foreign policy process. For these interest groups, their 
principal foreign policy concern is American policy toward the country or 
region of their origin. Hence, Jewish Americans are most often concerned 
with U.S. policy toward Israel, Irish Americans toward Ireland, Cuban 
Americans toward Cuba, and so on. Because of their singular focus on 
policy toward a particular country o r region, these individual ethnic groups 
tend to be highly motivated in their lobbying effort, and that level of ~o­
tivation often proves crucial in their effort to obtain their preferred pohcy 
from the American government. To be sure, some ethnic groups are mo~e 
successful than others, and we discuss those first. With all of the ethmc 
groups that we discuss, we will identify several factors that account for their 
relative success as compared to others. 
The Jewish Lobby 
By virtually all assessments, the Jewish lobby, or the Israel lobby, is per-
haps the most influential ethnic lobby today with the preponderance of 
its attention on issues related to the state of Israel and to the Middle East 
more generally. The Jewish lobby has been described as a "loose coalition 
of individuals and organizations that actively work to shape U.S. policy in a 
p~o-lsraei direction." This lobby has two umbrella organizations that coor-
dmate its activities, the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish 
Organizations and the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), 
but AIPAC is usually the organization most often identified with the Jew-
ish lobbying efforts. AlPAC has a relatively large membership at about 
o~e hundr~d thousand activists, has "a network of 10 regional offices and 
nme satelhte offices," and has a large and effective staff in its Washington 
offic~. AI PAC also provides a variety of services to its members in an effort 
~0 stimulate grassroots support for key issues. The organization's website, 
or ~mpl~, provides a wealth of information that allow its members to 
part•~;rate. m the foreign policy process: a summary of key issues under 
cons• erauon by ~ngress; a congressional directory to facilitate those who 
want to contact theiT representati 
. ves; numerous policy statements on issues Important to the organizatio . d 1. n, an a 1st of AIPAC policy achievements. 
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Furthermore, the website contains direct links, or buttons, for Capitol Hill 
staffers and for the press as additional ways to get its message out. Finally, 
and interestingly, AJPAC proudly proclaims its policy effectiveness: "The 
most important organization affecting America's relationship with Israel"'-
a descriptor provided by the New York Times some years ago. 
The Jewish lobby, and AIPAC in particular, have indeed been successful 
in affecting the direction of American foreign policy toward Israel and the 
Middle East more generally over the years. AIPAC has largely been able to 
gamer widespread support to promote legislation that it favors or to stop 
legislation that it opposes. In the 1970s, for example, it was able to obtain 
seventy-six Senate cosponsors for the JacksoJ).-Vanik Amendment to the 
Trade Act of 1974 that prohibited most-favored-nation {MFN)Siaurs to any 
state without a free emigration policy-a bill focused on the Soviet Union's 
restriction on Jewish emigration at the time. In the same decade, it also 
obtained seventy-six senators to sign a letter urging President Ford to sup-
port Israel in any peace effort in the Middle East. In the 1980s, AIPAC was 
instrumental in forcing the Reagan administration to alter the composition 
of an arms sale to Saudi Arabia, and, in 1988, Saudi Arabia purchased $30 
billion in arms from Britain rather than deal with congressional opposi-
tion from supporters of Israel. Currently, AIPAC points to several specific 
legislative actions to demonstrate the effectiveness of its lobbying: Hpassing 
more than a dozen bills and resolutions condemning and imposing tough 
sanctions on Iran, H supporting numerous resolutions passed in Congress 
that Haffirm congressional support for Israel's right to self-defense,"' and 
promoting legislation Hrequiring the administration to evaluate all future 
military sales to Arab states in the context of the need to maintain Israel's 
qualitative military edge over potential adversaries.H . .. Undoubtedly the 
best single indicator of congressional support, and a measure of AIPAC's 
policy success in that body, has been the fact that Israel has continuously 
received the highest amount of U.S. foreign assistance of any country over 
the past three decades-at $3 billion annually. 
What accounts for the success of this ethnic lobby-or indeed any ethnic 
lobby? After all, the number of Jewish Americans at 6.2 million constitutes 
less than 3 percent of America's population. How can this interest group 
seemingly be so influential? Political scientist Tony Smith in his Foreign 
Attachments begins to provide an answer for this group and others. Smith 
points to two general factors: (1) the structure of the American political 
system, and (2) the characteristics of ethnic groups themselves. The former 
factor refers to the plural nature of the American political system that allows 
interest groups access to the governmental process, while the latter refers 
to specific resources that ethnic groups can use to affect the process. The 
access that these groups have, Smith argues, is Hat the local, grassroots level 
of party selection of officeholders during primaries," "in the divisions that 
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naturally open between the executive and the legislature," and in *the divi-
sions within the legislature itself in Washington." Although these points 
of access are obviously important, the abili ty of ethnic groups to take ad-
vantage of them is arguably even more crucial. To do that and thus to gain 
influence, ethnic groups, Smith argues, potentially possess three important 
resources: (1) their ability to provide votes in key areas, (2) their ability 
to make campaign contributions to office seekers, and (3) their ability to 
organize and lobby on key issues. 
Applying these three criteria to the Jewish lobby, we begin to see how 
that lobby can be so effective. First of all, America's Jewish population 
tends to be concentrated in several key states. States along the east coast 
(New Yor~ New Jersey, Florida, and to a lesser extent Maryland and Mas-
sachusetts) tend to have large concentrations of Jewish voters as do the 
states of California, Illinois, and Ohio. Further, and importantly, Jews 
tend to participate in the political process at a much higher rate than other 
groups in American society. As a result, presidential candidates will likely 
be sensitive to the interests of Jewish voters in these states, especially since 
these states have a large number of electoral votes and especially in ye~s 
with closely-contested national elections. Second, the Jewish commumty 
and pro-Israel lobbying groups provide a large amount of campaign fund-
ing for congressional and presidential elections. According to the Center 
for Responsive Politics, pro-Israel groups provided some $13.8 million in 
campaign contributions in 2008 with 63 percent of those funds supporting 
Democratic candidates for office and 37 percent for Republican candidates. 
(AlPAC does not directly make campaign contributions, but it has close 
ties with political action committees [PACsl that can be used to make such 
contributions.) Moreover, the support or opposition of pro-Israel groups 
can be-and has been-crucial in the electoral fortunes of political can-
didates .... Third ... AlPAC has an effective and efficient organizational 
structure operating within Washington, DC. With its large contingent of 
activists nationwide, AlPAC is well positioned to elicit a grassroots response 
to Congress and the executive branch at any particular time. Furthermore, 
~PAC h~ effectively tied itself into the political decision-making network 
m Washmgton. One tangible, and important, indicator of its close linkage 
to the political leadership is the list of regular attendees and speakers at the 
annual AIPAC Policy conferences .... At the 2010 conference, Secretary 
of St~t~ llil~a~ Clinton gave a plenary address summarizing the Obama 
admmtsu:auon s continued support for Israel, but the delegates also heard 
presentations by public officials from across the political spectrum: Sena-
tors Charles Schumer (D-NY), Lindsey Graham (R-SC), and Evan Bayh (D-
IN); Gover:no.rs Martin O'Malley (D-MD) and Tim Pawlenty (R-MN); and 
HE~usCae MaJo(nty Leader Steny !Ioyer (D-MD) and House Republican Whip 
nc ntor R-VA) 
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Beyond Smith's three criteria, another crucial factor also contributes to 
the effectiveness of any ethnic group. The late Senator Charles McC. Math-
ias identified that factor about three decades ago, albeit in an inverse way. 
"Foreign lobbies," he wrote, "that lack significant domestic support exert 
only limited influence on American foreign policy." A lack of domestic sup-
port is hardly the case for the Jewish lobby. Among the American public, 
the level of support for Israel remains very high. In February 2010, 63 per-
cent of the American public expressed more sympathy with the Israelis than 
with the Palestinians, and such high levels of support have generally been 
the case for the past twenty years of Gallup polling data. Moral, ethical, and 
political considerations are the important reasons for this substantial sup-
port among the American public for Israel. ... 
A final important factor that impacts the effectiveness of any ethnic group 
is the extent to which a countervailing ethnic group is active on similar 
foreign policy issues. Three pro-Arab lobbies, the National Association of 
Arab Americans (NAAA) founded in 1972, the American-Arab Anti-Dis-
crimination Committee (ADC) founded in 1980, and the Arab American 
Institute (AAI) founded in 1985, have tended not to be nearly as effective 
as the Jewish lobby over the years and thus have not served as effective 
counterweights. Indeed, the NAAA and ADC joined together in 2001, 
undoubtedly in an effort to increase their effectiveness .... Nonetheless, 
these groups cannot be judged as effective as the pro-Israel lobby. Part of 
the difficulty for these groups, based upon our earlier criteria for an interest 
group's success in gaining influence, is the lack of an effective voting bloc 
among the American public that they can directly appeal to for support, the--
limited campaign contributions that these groups (or their PACs) provide 
in election campaigns, and the relatively low public support for Arab states 
and the Palestinian Authority among the American people .... Perhaps the 
founder of ADC and former U.S. senator James Abourezk best summarized 
the chaJienge facing his group, and the Arab lobbies more generally: "To 
have influence in Congress you have to have money for candidates or con-
trol lots of votes. We're trying to build a grass-roots network; it's difficult 
for us to raise money." 
Despite the Jewish lobby's success, it is not without controversy over 
its influence. In a recent controversial article, and later book, two politi-
cal scientists John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt raised questions about 
this lobby's undue influence on American foreign policy (see chapter 5). 
In particular, they contend that the strength of the Israel Lobby more fully 
accounts for American policy toward Israel than moral or strategic explana-
tions by the public or its leaders, and they caJI for a more open discussion of 
the power of this particular ethnic lobby on American foreign policy. More 
recently, another book, Transforming America's Israel Lobby, appeared and it 
also assessed an array of Jewish lobbies, including AIPAC. Importantly, it 
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argued that AI PAC did not wholly reflect the views of the American Jewish 
community. 
Indeed, AIPAC policy positions-which are often seen as too hard-line 
and often wholly supportive of the Israeli government in power-has cre-
ated a division within the Jewish community, and that division has now 
stimulated the emergence of an opposition group. In 2008, J Street wa~ es-
tablished . .. . Its goals are to give a "political voice to mainstream Amen~n 
Jews and other supporters of Israel who ... believe that a two-state soluuon 
to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is essential to Israel's survival." The orga-
nization not only hopes to promote this policy position but also seeks "to 
ensure a broad debate on Israel and the Middle East in national politics and 
the American Jewish community. w Moreover, J Street has sought to broaden 
its base by joining with the Jewish Alliance for Justice and Peace in Janu-
ary 2010, and it now claims to have 150,000 supporters that it can call on 
to contact members of Congress. Still, one recent analysis raises questions 
about its staying power and its ability to maintain support among the Jew-
ish community .... 
The Cuban Lobby 
A second influential ethnic group in recent years has been a Hispa_nic 
group, the Cuban Lobby. The Cuban American National Foundauon 
(CANF), founded in 1981 by Jorge Mas Canosa, is the principal Cuban 
lobby. It originated with those Cuban emigres who fled the Fidel Castro 
regime in Cuba after the 1959 revolution and also included some who had 
participated in the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in April 1961. From the 
outset, its principal foreign policy aim was to affect U.S. policy toward Cuba. 
Over the years, this general aim has largely meant the maintenance of the 
American embargo against Cuba and the promotion of the return of democ-
racy to that island nation as soon as possible. At present, CANF identifies its 
~ission as directed toward producing "nonviolent and meaningful" change 
m Cuba, providing support to those seeking to effect change within Cuba, 
and "working to counteract the Castro regime's propaganda machine." 
For a. re.latively ~mall lobby, CANF has seemingly been remarkably suc-
cessful m mfluenang the conduct of American foreign policy toward Cuba. 
The tr~de embargo against Cuba, originally imposed in the early 1960s by 
execuuve order, has remained in effect to this day. Indeed, the embargo 
was actually strengthened in the 1990s by two legislative actions. With the 
~assage of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, the embargo was codified 
mto law, rather than being dependent upon an executive order, and with 
the passage of ~e Helms-Burton Act (or more formally the Cuban Liberty 
and Democratic Solidarity Act) of 1996 the e b · d'fi d 
. 1 . , m argo was agam co 1 1e mto aw and two 1mportant dd' · 1 . . a 1t1ona restncuons were placed upon in-
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teractions with Cuba. Title III of the Helm-Burton Act allowed Americans 
to sue foreign companies "trafficking in stolen propertyn in Cuba. That is, 
if a foreign company was operating on or doing business with property in 
Cuba that was previously owned by Americans before Castro's seizure of 
such property, that company could be sued. Title IV in the act would deny 
American visas to officials from such companies that were "traffickingn in 
stolen Cuban properties . ... 
The continuance of the embargo and the passage of these pieces of leg-
islations represent important policy successes for CANF. Yet they are not 
the only ones reflecting its impact. CANF was instrumental in promoting 
the establishment of Radio Marti, a U.S. government-sponsored station to 
broadcast to Cuba during the Reagan administration. During the Clinton 
years, this lobby was important in stopping some administrative appoint-
ments to the State Department that it did not approve and in prodding the 
administration to respond to Cuba's shooting down of two unarmed planes 
of the "Brothers to the Rescue" organization in international waters off 
Cuba. In 2003, in fact, CANF called for the indictment of Fidel Castro over 
this episode. The George W. Bush administration did not change American 
policy during its tenure, and the Obama administration has not either. 
In this sense, there remains largely a status-quo approach to Cuba by the 
United States-and the CANF seems in part to be an important reason why. 
If we apply our earlier criteria for ethnic group effectiveness to this 
group, we begin to see why this is the case. Although the Cuban American 
population (estimated at about 1.2 million) is relatively small within the 
United States, it is concentrated in some key electoral states (e.g., Florida 
and New Jersey), and CANF has been able to utilize that electoral dout to 
maintain influence. Furthermore, over the years, CANF was operating in a 
political environment in which there was public and leadership support 
to pressure the Cuban regime. During the Cold War years, relatively few 
political leaders were willing to propose the easing of the embargo against 
Cuba. Indeed, few leaders were willing to promote any policy that would 
be viewed as in any way accommodating Castro's communist regime in 
Cuba. In this sense, CANF's position was reinforced by Cold War politics. 
In addition, its leadership, especially under Jorge Mas Canosa, was well 
connected in official Washington and was able to provide some support to 
favored political candidates. Moreover, CANF was also regarded as an effec-
tive lobby in Congress when it needed to be. One member of Congress put 
it this way: "[CANF) uses difficult, difficult tactics whenever you disagree 
with them. • Finally, and perhaps the most compelling factor for the Cuban 
lobby's success, there is the high degree of policy motivation and intensity 
among its members. Their antipathy toward the Castro regime and their 
determination to elicit change in Cuba have been critically important to 
the lobby's success. 
76 James M . M cCormicll 
In the last decade or so, CANF has in fact experienced some difficulty in 
maintaining this same level of intensity and unity-and influence. Several 
reasons account for this change: the death of CANF founder, Jorge Mas 
Canosa, in 1997; the generational divide between older Cuban America~s 
who experienced the Castro regime and younger Cuban Americans born m 
the United States without that direct experience; and the rise of other lob-
bying groups-some more inclined toward improving Cuban-American re-
lations and others more inclined toward no accommodation with Castro's 
regime under any circumstance. Overall, though, and like the Jewish lobby, 
the Cuban lobby remains a formidable example of an ethnic group with an 
impact on foreign policy. 
Greek, Turkish, and Armenian Lobbies 
The Greek, Turkish, and Armenian lobbies are three other ethnic lob-
bies that have operated for some time. Each has sought to affect American 
policy toward southeast Europe and the Middle East. The issues of concern 
to these three groups are often similar, but each lobby's positions (andes-
pecially the Greek and Turkish lobbies) are often at odds with one another. 
Hence, the actions of these differing ethnic groups have often complicated 
American foreign policymaking on several key issues toward the countries 
of origin for these lobbies. 
The first of these three groups is the Greek lobby, or the American 
He~ Institute (Alii). This organization was established in 1974, im-
mediately after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. A year later, the American 
Hellenic Institute Public Affairs Committee {AHIPAC) was created with the 
express goal to focus on lobbying on behalf of Greek Americans. The cur-
rent foreign policy goals of this lobby focus primarily on American policy 
toward Greece, Cyprus, and the region surrounding these countries. Specifi-
cally, AHI seeks to strengthen American ties with Greece, remove the Turk-
ish occupation from Cyprus, support sovereignty for Greece in the Aegean 
Sea, and oppose the use of MMacedoniaN by the Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia in its name. 
~is lob~y points to several important successes in affecting American 
fore1gn pohcy over the past four decades. Undoubtedly AHI's principal suc-
~ess was persuading Congress to impose an arms embargo against Turkey 
m 1975 over that country's invasion of Cyprus a year earlier and to sustain 
that embargo for some three years until June 1978. This American action 
~as seen as punishment for Turkey's use of U.S. arms during its interven-
u~~ and occupation of Cyprus, an action that directly violated the Foreign 
M1htary Sales Act AHI also d · · . . 
· a1ms as Important achievements the mamte-
nance of American military · G 
f . assistance to reece at 70 percent of the level o such assistance to Turkey Co , 1· · . 
' ngress s e 1mmat1on of economic grant aid 
Ethnic Interest Groups in American Foreign Policy 77 
to Turkey in 1995, and the halting of direct trade by the United States with 
the Turkish-controlled northern sector of Cyprus .... 
The strength of this lobby is partially tied to the number of Greek Ameri-
cans (the estimates range from 1.38 million to 3 million). Despite their 
modest numbers within the American population, these Greek Americans 
tend to be concentrated in some urban areas, are active in politics, and well 
connected within their communities. Hence, they have the potential to 
exercise some electoral influence. Importantly, the American Hellenic Insti-
tute is also well organized and effective in its lobby activities, particularly 
on Capitol Hill. Its relative success as a lobbying organization has also been 
tied to a number of prominent Greek Americans who have held influen-
tial and leadership positions within Congress over the years. In addition, 
the House Congressional Caucus on Hellenic Issues provides yet another 
means for the Greek American community to influence the congressional 
process. 
A countervailing group for the Greek . . . lobby is the Turkish lobby. The 
principal organization for promoting Turkish interests in the United States 
is the Turkish Coalition of America (TCA), although there is a broad array 
of other Turkish American groups in existence as well. The TCA is a rela-
tively new organization, only established in 2007, and it has a number of 
social, cultural, and educational activities. ft also engages in numerous po-
litical activities to advance issues important to Turkey and the Middle East 
region. Although Turkish interests have been heavily involved in seeking to 
stop the passage of the Armenian genocide resolution in the U.S. Congress, 
it has also been engaged over issues related to America's relationship with 
Greece, the issue of Cyprus, and sovereignty concerns in the Aegean Sea. 
The impact of the Turkish lobby appears to come less from the size of the 
Turkish American population or its campaign contributions and more from 
its successful efforts to engage in lobbying on Capitol I lill The Turkish 
American population is only about a tenth of the size of the Greek Ameri 
can population; hence, it is a substantially less significant voting bloc and 
source of campaign contributions than is the Greek American community. 
Instead, the Turkish lobbying must stress Turkey's strategic importance for 
the United States when seeking to advance its interests with Congress or the 
executive branch . . . . (Tjhe Turkish community can routinely wo~k with th_e 
House Congressional Caucus on U.S.-Turkish Relations and Turkrsh Amen· 
cans ... but it also relies upon support from the Turkish gove~ment to 
lobby more directly with Congress or the executive branch ln. thrs conn_ec· 
tion, the Turkish government itself has often been invol~ed m ?efendrng 
its interests by employing prominent Americans as lobbyrsts on rts_behalf. 
At the time of the debate over the 2007 Armenian genocide resoluuon. for 
example, two prominent former members of Congress-~obert Uvingston 
{R-IA), former Speaker of the 1 louse-designate, and Richard Gephardt 
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(D-MO), former majority leader of the House-were deeply involved in 
seeking to stop this resolution. 
The third ethnic lobby seeking to affect American policy toward this re-
gion is the Armenian lobby. Its principal organizations are the Armenian 
Assembly and the Armenian National Committee of America. As we indi-
cated earlier, this lobby has been extremely active and involved in seeking 
passage of the Armenian genocide resolution that targets Turkey. Yet it a~so 
works to advance a number of other aims regarding American foreign pohcy 
and Armenia. For instance, this lobby seeks to increase American assistance 
for Armenia and to obtain direct aid for Nagorno Karabakh. (Nagorno 
Karabakh is a territory wholly within Azerbaijan that is largely populated 
by Armenians. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union in particular, this ter-
ritory has been contested between Azerbaijan and Armenia, including a war 
between the two countries that ended in 1994.) At the same time, it seeks to 
deny American aid to Azerbaijan, its regional rival, especially in light of the 
trade blockade by that nation toward Armenia. Finally, and importantly, 
this lobby promotes independence for Nagorno Karabakh .... 
The Armenian lobby has had some success in obtaining these goals-or 
at least in making progress on them. American assistance to Armenia sin~e 
its independence from the former Soviet Union has totaled nearly $2 bil-
lion, and Armenia has also received funding through the Millennium Chal-
lenge Account, a program initiated by the George W. Bush administration 
to aid selected countries that meet several key performance indicators. The 
United States has also provided some direct assistance to Nagorno Kara-
bakh, much as the lobby desired. 
This success of this lobby is somewhat surprising in that there is a rela-
tively small population ( 446,000) claiming Armenian ancestry within the 
United States. However, that population is politically active and involved. 
Much of the Armenian American population is concentrated in the Ameri-
can West, and importantly in some congressional districts in California, 
and that fact aids the lobby's impact. The main sponsor of the Armenian 
genocide resolutions in Congress in 2007 and 2010 was Congressman 
Adam Schiff from the 29th district in California. That congressional district 
has an Armenian American population that totals sixty-seven thousand, 
more than 10 percent of its total size. Such a concentration of Armenian 
~ericans. in th~s district undoubtedly contributed to Rep. Schiffs interest 
m promoung thts resolution (as it had done for his predecessor in that seat, 
former congressman James Rogan). 
ThArm' N' 
. e .~man a~onal Committee of America (ANCA), however, re-
mams p~hu~lly acttve beyond this single district. It conducts national 
voter ;eglstratton drives, endorses candidates for office, and issues "report 
cards on members of Congress 1 dd' . . 
. . . n a 1Uon to 1ts electoral efforts, the 
Armeman commumty has pro d b a · · ve to e an euectJve lobbymg organization 
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in Washington with good connections on Capitol Hill. ... Further, the 
Congressional Caucus on Armenian Issues, established in 1995, now has 
150 members from the House of Representatives. This caucus thus provides 
yet another mechanism for keeping Armenian-related issues before political 
leaders and the public. 
EMERGING ETHNIC LOBBIES 
Over the last several decades, a number of other ethnic lobbies have also 
sought to engage in America's foreign policy process. These groups have 
not been as continuously active, organized, or influential as some of the 
ones that we have just discussed, but they may become increasingly conse-
quential in the future. We focus on four of these new and emerging ethnic 
lobbies. 
Mexican American Lobby 
The Mexican American lobby is the first. The Mexican American commu-
nity is a significantly larger Hispanic group than the Cuban American com-
munity, but it has generally been described as much less successful as an 
ethnic lobby. With at least 21 million and perhaps as many as 30 million 
Mexican Americans, this group potentially provides an enormous voting 
bloc, a significant source of campaign contributions, and a potent lobbying 
force. Part of the explanation for their lack of success is that this community ..... 
is not as well organized to lobby or as committed on forei&!!_Policy issues 
as othe;-emnic--gTOOps-two important requirements for lobbying sucCeSs 
as we pointed out earlier .... [Indeed, one analyst! was even more decisive 
about the effect of this ethnic lobby: •The Hispanic community exerts al-
most no systematic influence on U.S.-Latin American relations, or, for that 
matter, on U.S. foreign policy in general." 
Such a conclusion, however, may need to be altered somewhat, espe-
cially on the issue of immigration and especially in light of recent Mexican 
American activism on state and national legislation related to that issue. 
Indeed, one analyst argues that the Mexican American community has •two 
effective national organizations in the National Council of La Raza and 
the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund," and contends 
that this community was active in affecting the Immigration Reform and 
Control Act of 1986 and the Immigration Act of 1990. These measures •ef-
fectively blocked meaningful changes" over prevailing "migration patterns" 
and included Hamnesty provisions" that "surely substantially accelerated" 
these patterns. More recently, as Congress was taking up immigration 
legislation in 2006 and beyond, several Mexican American organizations 
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conducted nationwide demonstrations to protest this legislation. In 2010, 
this same community also became active over an immigration law passed 
by the state of Arizona. In this sense, on the immigration issue, the growing 
Mexican American population may well play a role in shaping U.S. policy 
in the future. On other foreign policy issues-the promotion of NAFTA and 
Mexican democracy, for example-this community has been judged as h~v­
ing a decidedly limited impact. Yet given the overall size of this commumty 
(particularly in some western states), the potential for foreign policy influ-
ence in the years ahead remains a distinct possibility. 
The Rebirth of the Eastern European Lobby 
Shortly after the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the gaini~g 
of independence of numerous states in the old Soviet empire, a new ethmc 
organization, the Central and Eastern European Coalition (CEEC), emerge~ 
in the United States to promote the interests of these new nations. Thts 
organization, established in 1994, was indeed a coalition-a collection of 
eighteen national organizations, representing Americans who traced th~ir 
ancestry to Hungary, latvia, Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
Estonia, Georgia, Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine. In a sense, this lobby 
might be thought of as the successor to the "captive nations" lobby of the 
19 50s that sought freedom and independence for those nations behind the 
iron curtain, albeit now with goals that seek greater stability and security f~r 
this region of the world. Supporters of the CEEC argue that the economiC 
and security interests of the United States "demand an unwavering com-
mitment to and sustained engagement with the Central and East European 
countries." In this sense, the well-being of these coalition nations and the 
United States should be wholly tied together. 
To enhance this linkage, the coalition promotes and supports a number 
of ongoing American policies. CEEC, for example, has been a major pro-
ponent ~NATO expansion and the incorporation of these new states in 
that organization to maintain their security and independence. It currently 
supports moving Georgia and Ukraine toward full NATO membership in 
accordance with the organization's Membership Action Plan (MAP). CEEC 
also strongly supports the principal aid and reform initiatives taken by the 
United States over the past three administrations-the Support for East Eu-
ropean Democracy (SEED) dating back to 1989, the Freedom Support Act 
(FSA) of 1992, and the more recent Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) 
program of 2004-and views them as important mechanisms to advance 
democratic and market reforms in the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe. furthermore, the coalition promotes more vigorous action on the 
part ~f ~e United ~tates "to counter Russia's neo-imperialism • both within 
Russta ttself and wtthin this region of the world. 
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American foreign policy generally comports with the principal goals of 
the coalition. In this sense, it is less dear how much effect the CEEC has had 
in shaping these policies as compared to the general political environment 
of the post-Cold War years. Still, CEEC has sought to keep its principal 
issues before America's political leaders through a variety of informational 
and educational activities. With its headquarters in Washington, DC, the 
CEEC and its affiliate organizations regularly hold events and discussion 
forums in Washington, on Capitol Hill, or even at the White House as 
important mechanisms for shaping the foreign policy debate about this 
region of the world. Furthermore, CEEC has developed a series of position 
papers that are routinely shared with members of the current American 
administration. Finally, supportive members of Congress have formed the 
Congressional Caucus on Central and Eastern Europe as yet another way 
to discuss these issues, although the impact of this caucus appears to be 
rather modest. 
Through its member organizations, CEEC has the potential to reach the 
22 million Americans who share an ancestry from this part of the world 
and serve as an important voting bloc. Since most Americans with central 
and eastern European heritage are concentrated in the Midwest, this region 
would seem especially ripe for electoral impact if these foreign policy issues 
were to dominate the campaign agenda. At the present time, however, the 
coalition does not appear to have a ready mechanism to mobilize them in 
the way that we have seen with some of the more successful ethnic lobbies. 
Overall, then, the CEEC cannot be judged as having the influential effect 
on foreign policy as either the Jewish, Cuban, Greek, or Armenian lobbies . 
. . . If issues pertaining to this region were to reemerge as central to Ameri-
can foreign policy, and with greater organizational development within 
CEEC, this lobby might be able to exert increased influence. 
African American Lobby 
A third ethnic lobby that has emerged over the past several decades is the 
African American lobby. TransAfrica (or the TransAfrica Forum) is the prin-
cipal organization that promotes the interests of those with African heritage 
in the United States, the Caribbean, and parts of Latin America. It was 
founded in 1977 and pursues a number of goals relating to creating greater 
economic justice globally, reducing American militarism, and promoting 
democracy in Africa and among the African diaspora. To achieve such goals, 
TransAfrica has taken a number of actions to try to affect American foreign 
policy over the past four decades. 
Its lobbying efforts began in the late 1970s, and it has continued to 
try to influence American foreign policy in this way during each succeed-
ing decade. One of its initial actions focused on seeking to maintain U.S. 
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economic sanctions on white-ruled Rhodesia in southern Africa. By 1980, 
this activity, and a series of actions by a number of others, resulted in the 
creation of the state of Zimbabwe from this former British colony. A few 
years later, this organization lobbied the Reagan administration to impose 
economic sanctions on South Africa over its apartheid policy. In 1986, 
TransAfrica supported efforts by Congress to override a presidential veto 
and pass the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, a measure that strengthened the 
administration's executive order of 1985. By the early 1990s, TransAfrica 
was influential in prodding the Clinton administration to take strong~r 
measures against those who had overthrown the democratic government I? 
Haiti. ln 1994, moreover, the Clinton administration did order an Amen-
can intervention in Haiti, and the military rulers fled the country. 
In the twenty-first century, this organization continued its lobbying ~f­
fort, albeit with decidedly more mixed results. For instance, TransAfrica 
opposed the African Growth and Opportunity Act, which was enacted into 
law, over concern of how much it would aid Africa, and it also opposed the 
creation of the NAfrica Command" within the American military structure 
because the organization viewed it as leading to a greater militarization 
within Africa. TransAfrica also worked to oppose the increasingly repres-
sive Robert Mugabe government in Zimbabwe, also with limited success. 
At the present time, TransAfrica focuses on seeking relief for the substantial 
debt owed by Africa and the Caribbean countries, continues to oppose the 
militarization of Africa, and seeks to promote Nhuman rights, fair trade, and 
self-determination of African peoples" as Nthe cornerstone of U.S. policy 
towards Africa." 
Unlike many of the other ethnic lobbies that we have discussed, the 
African American lobby appears to do a great deal of its work with civil 
society groups abroad (in various countries in Africa and elsewhere) and 
with Americans of African ancestry at home. In this sense, there is poten-
tially a substantial grassroots component to TransAfrica, but the extent of 
its following at home as a whole is not dear. Furthermore, it has a limited 
domestic electoral base and has not been a major campaign contributor 
to candidates for elective office. In this sense, TransAfrica does not possess 
some of the important characteristics that we identified as important for a 
successful ethnic lobby .... TransAfrica . . . has a natural ally in the Con-
gressional Black Caucus (since its founding is linked to this caucus), and 
that tie helps it to gain access and influence in official Washington. Overall, 
though, this organization appears less well organized and influential than 
some of the other ethnic lobbies that we have discussed. Nevertheless, 
TransAfrica has the potential to appeal to the African American community 
within the United States, especially on issues related to Africa and on issues 
related to global social justice. 
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The Indian Lobby 
The newest ethnic lobby, and the most influential of this group, _is the 
Indian lobby. This lobby consists of those Americans whose ~ncest£)_' ts ued 
to the country of India. The number of Americans with Astan Indtan an 
cestry totals between 1. 7 and 1.9 million in the 200? U.S. Census and was 
estimated at "over 2.5 million" in 2007. The total ts probably somewhat 
larger today, but still, even with a modest increase, the percentag~ of Indian 
Americans represents less than 1 percent of the total U.S. populauon Yettn 
one recent assessment, this lobby has been described as "the only lobby tn 
Washington likely to acquire the strength of the Israel lobby." 
How can this descriptor be possible for such a relatively small group? 
As was the case with other groups of relatively small size (e.g., the Cuban 
lobby, the Armenian lobby), an important part of the explanation res ts 
with the substantial motivation of members of this community, the ele\ 
toral clout- both through voting blocs and campaign contributions- that 
the lobby possesses in particular states and districts around the coumry, 
and the improved organizational structure that it has put into pla\ C m 
recent years. Finally-and hardly inconsequential-the changed interna-
tional political environment over the past two decades has also aided the 
emergence of the Indian lobby. 
Over the years, numerous disparate Indian American organizations have 
existed, but these organizations were often organized "along professional 
occupational lines" (e.g., the American Association of Physicians of I nd tan 
Origin and the Asian American Hotel Owners Association). In 2002, how 
ever, the U.S. India Po litical Action Committee (USINPAC) was formed, es 
tablished itself in the "K-Street neighborhood" in Washington, DC, hired a 
staff of professionals committed to advancing a series of important foreign 
and domestic policy goals, and put into place a comprehensive organi?a-
tional structure for lobbying. Thus, this organization today is the principal 
lobbying organization for the Indian American community .. .. 
USINPA~ has ~ number of goals, b_oth !n foreign and domestic policy 
In the foretgn pohcy arena, USINPAC 1s pnmarily interested in strengthen-
ing U.S-Indian bilateral relations across the spectrum-defense, trade and 
?usi~ess. _It i~ also interest~d in pr~moting "a fair and balanced poli~ on 
tmmtgr~uon an_d addressmg the 1ssue of international terrorism. In the 
domestic arena, 1ts concerns focus on protecting the civil rights of 1 d . 




uba ?PPOrtunity for members of this community, 
an a vocaung 10r sma u~·~~sse_s as well. To achieve these goals, USIN-
PA1C hads.da broathd a~ay of actlvlttes mduding ho lding fundraisers for pol iti-
ca can 1 ates at 1t supports, hosting receptions and b · fi c · 1 
· 1 · . . ne mgs on apno Htl , sponsonng tripS to lnd1a for its supporters and pro · d · )" · f 
its key issues and events on its website. Further~ore th . vt mg_ a 1~tmg 0 
' IS orgamzat1on and 
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its associated groups work with two congressional caucuses dealing with 
India: the Congressional Caucus on India and Indian Americans in the 
House, and the Friends of India Caucus in the Senate. Finally, USINPAC 
also has a "National Outreach Program" that seeks to coordinate issue 
positions among affiliated groups, and it has been active in promoting 
Indian Americans who are competing for elective offices nationwide. In 
all, USINPAC in a relatively short period of time has established itself as a 
comprehensive and effective organization. 
Other important characteristics of the Indian American community also 
facilitate its activism and impact. Indian Americans tend to be highly edu-
cated (with 64 percent over twenty-five with a college degree), economically 
successful (with a median income almost twice that of most Americans), and 
well connected. By one estimate, Indian Americans own "20 percent of all 
the companies in Silicon Valleyw in California; and "the U.S.-India Business 
Council, which has a core committee of 200 companies that make up part 
of the United States' corporate elite, is closely allied with the India lobby.· In 
this sense, the Indian lobby can reach out to a number of supporters beyond 
its core constituents to enhance its influence in the political process. Further-
more, and importantly, the Indian American community tends to be concen-
trated in particularly important electoral states (e.g., California, Washington, 
New York, Illinois, Texas, and Pennsylvania), and it has been increasingly a 
generous campaign contributor to its supporters in government. ... 
Although these organizational and individual characteristics account for 
a great deal of the rise of the Indian lobby, the political and economic en-
vironment surrounding U.S.-lndian relations over the past two decades also 
provided the occasion for this lobby to promote its foreign policy goals. 
First of all, with the end of the Cold War and the implosion of the Soviet 
Union, an opportunity developed for restarting U.S.-Indian relations, a 
relationship that had been decidedly cool with India's ties to the Soviet 
Union for so many years. Second, India is the world's largest democracy, 
and it is also one of the world's most dynamic economies. In this sense, 
India may well be America's new "ally" as Fareed Zakaria described it in 
The Post-American World. Third, in the post-9/11 era, India is also located 
in an important but volatile part of the world for the United States. Strong 
and productive relations with India are increasingly crucial for American 
foreign policy. For all of these reasons, then, the India lobby has had an 
opportunity to affect American foreign policy. 
~d the .Indian lobby has done so. Perhaps the most important foreign 
poliC~ achteve~e~t of this lobby was the passage of legislation in 2006 
that hfted restncttons on nuclear fuels trade by the United States with In-
dia._ Su~ restrictions had been in place for several decades as part of U.S. 
obhgauons under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and domes-
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tic laws, dating back to India's "peaceful" nuclear explosion in 1974 and 
exacerbated by India's nuclear test in the late 1990s. Despite a skeptical 
Congress heading into an election in the fall of 2006 and a weakened Bush 
presidency from the Iraq War, both Houses of Congress gave approval to 
this legislation. One recent analysis argues that Mindian-American mobiliza-
tion was the critical factor behind overwhelming congressional support" for 
this legislation approval. 
ETHNIC LOBBIES AND THEIR INFLUENCE: 
SOME CONCLUSIONS 
This survey of America's ethnic lobbies leads to several important conclu-
sions about their impact on American foreign policy. First of all, ethnic 
groups matter. The Jewish lobby, the Cuban lobby, the Greek lobby, and, 
more recently, the Indian lobby have impacted American foreign policy in 
important ways, although their impact has primarily been tied to issues re-
lated to U.S. policy toward the country of each lobby's focus. In this sense, 
the lobbies may not appear to have a general effect on the overall conduct 
of American foreign policy. Yet, in fact, they do .... The more vexing ques-
tion is how much the ethnic lobby shapes American policy toward a coun-
try or region compared to a variety of other factors. 
Second, some lobbies have more influence on American foreign policy 
than others. This effectiveness is primarily due to a number of important 
group and organizational characteristics that we discussed throughout the 
chapter. The size of the ethnic community, the distribution of the group's 
population in particular congressional districts or states, and the group's 
political activism and involvement are important factors shaping an ethnic 
group's policy impact. Recall, for example, the size and involvement of 
the Jewish American and the Greek American communities compared to 
the Arab American or Turkish American communities. A large degree of 
motivation and commitment to a particular policy position, however, can 
often overcome an ethnic group's relative lack of size (e.g., the Armenian 
lobby). The ethnic group's organizational capacity and its skill in getting its 
message upward to policymakers and downward to its supporters are also 
important factors affecting its degree of policy effect. Note the organiza-
tional strength of the Jewish and the Indian lobbies as compared to that of 
the African American, Mexican, and Eastern European lobbies. 
Third, the type of policy sought by an ethnic lobby affects its success. 
Lobbies that are seeking to change American foreign policy in some im-
portant way (e.g., the Armenian lobby, the Greek lobby, or the Indian 
lobby) often have a bigger challenge than those lobbies that are seeking to 
86 ]ames M. McCormick 
reinforce current policy or the status quo (e.g., the Cuban lobby, the Jewish 
lobby, or even the Central and Eastern European lobbies). 
Fourth, an ethnic lobby that forms a coalition with other ethnic lobbies 
will likely have more effect on policy. The Armenian lobby, for example, 
has been able to work with the Greek lobby to oppose Turkish interests, 
while the Turkish lobby for a time gained support from the Jewish lobby. In 
this sense, the limited capacity of one group is leveraged with the assistance 
of another. In the future, in fact, we are likely to see more and more of this 
ethnic group cooperation as a mechanism to accomplish their goals. 
In large measure, the conclusions discussed so far could reasonably be 
made about any type of interest group-ethnic or otherwise-but these 
ethnic groups also possess a quality that distinguishes them from other 
interest groups in one important way. That quality is the close personal 
identity that members of these ethnic groups feel toward the policy issues 
at hand. That is, the strong "identity politics" of ethnic group members, 
or, put differently, "the strong emotional bonds of large numbers of 
Americans to their cultural or ancestral homes, • has been characterized as 
the usecret weapon" of these ethnic groups. Although these bonds can be 
beneficial to ethnic group members, they have also been criticized as hav-
ing the potential of being carried to excess and thus proving "harmful to 
the national interest." ... 
Several years ago, noted political scientist Samuel Huntington certainly 
advanced that argument. He contended that "ethnic interests are gener-
ally transnational or nonnational," they "promote the interests of people 
and entities outside the United States," and they thus erode the pursuance 
of the national interest. The usual response is to argue that the national 
interest is not self-evident and that it is, in fact, the result of the competi-
tion among competing interests, including ethnic interests. Such a view, 
of course, fails to recognize the relative weight of some groups over others 
in this competition-and the resulting "national interest. " In this con-
nection, there is no doubt about the need to make certain that the ethnic 
lobbies continue to place their interests within the context of the collective 
interest of American foreign policy. Yet policymakers are aware of this di-
lemma, and much as they learned to manage the impact of the media on 
foreign policy (the so-called CNN effect), they are increasingly aware of, 
and seek to manage, the effects of ethnic lobbying. Yet the management of 
these lobbies is far from complete by policymakers. That is, these ethnic 
lo~bie~, often "experts" on a particular foreign policy issue, may combine 
w1th h1ghly reputable reporters and media outlets to create what Bonardi 
and ~eim describe as a "reputation cascade" for a "widely salient issue." 
By th1s process, both the public and policymakers have lost their decision 
latitude on a~ iss~e-and in ~is way, ethnic lobbies may continue to in-
fluence the dnecuon of Amencan foreign policy .... 
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DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 
1. How large are foreign policy interest groups in the United States, and 
how varied are such groups? 
2. What are ethnic interest groups, and do they differ from foreign lob-
bies? 
3. What are the principal ethnic lobbies in the conduct of American 
foreign policy today? 
4. What are the key characteristics that make ethnic interest groups effec-
tive in affecting foreign policy? 
5. How well do the Jewish lobby and the Cuban lobby fit with the char-
acteristics of successful ethnic lobbies? 
6. How successful have the Greek, Turkish, and Armenian lobbies been 
in affecting U.S. foreign policy? What issues are of most interest and 
importance to these groups? 
7. Among the emerging ethnic lobbies, which one appears to be the 
most effective? Why is that so, and on what issues is that group most 
influential? 
8. What is the one quality that makes ethnic groups distinctive from 
other interest groups? 
9. Are ethnic interest groups helpful or harmful to the conduct of Ameri-
can foreign policy? 
